More important, though, is that the war has become Mr. Putin’s ultimate tool for controlling the country and ensuring no one steps out of line. It has been brutally wielded to drive out dissenting voices from the country, turning a whole generation of opponents into exiles. The war serves as a perfect gag order on those in the system, too. As long as it continues, even the so-called systemic liberals — the pro-Western faction within Russia’s government that holds key positions in the economy and business world — will remain silent. Many of them are clearly unhappy. But while the war drags on, they will not speak out.
The dangers of peace, on the other hand, are plain. It would return a more than a million-strong army home and a rung of high-ranking veterans to civilian life. What will they do? A warning signal was sent last month when one of Russia’s most prominent war veterans and the president’s envoy to the Urals district, Artem Zhoga, dared to criticize a possible minerals deal with America floated by Mr. Putin. “These resources are part of a strategic reserve, and I urge my colleagues in the regions to ensure their preservation in the interests of the state,” Mr. Zhoga said. Notably, he did not mention the president.
For Mr. Putin, it was an ominous intervention. Shut out from key government positions — not a single war veteran has been placed in a senior leadership role, even after extensive reshuffling at the defense ministry — veterans are a potential pool of resentment. While the war continues, they cannot afford to step out of line. Were peace to come, they may well follow the footsteps of the former Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in railing against Mr. Putin and his regime. Mr. Putin, of course, cannot allow that to happen. To prevent a veterans’ revolt, he must not end the war. His political survival depends on it.
As does the economy, which has been fully reshaped to serve the war effort. The government has been restructured to follow a Stalinist principle: “Everything for the front, everything for victory.” The state apparatus now operates in service of the military-industrial complex. The most influential figure in Russia’s economy is Sergey Chemezov, Mr. Putin’s longtime colleague from the K.G.B. who now heads Rostec, the state-owned military conglomerate. That tells you how entwined political power, the war and the economy have become.
Some Russian business leaders argue that the war has even benefited parts of the country that had long been in economic decline. Once idle defense factories are now running at full capacity, fulfilling government contracts and creating jobs. Unlike the prewar years — when wealth was concentrated in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major cities — state funding is now flowing into Russia’s economically depressed regions. The Kremlin’s bet on military Keynesianism, making use of oil revenues to redirect the economy to meet the war’s needs, has largely paid off.
